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WHAT CONSTITUTES A PARTNERSHIP?
It is not an unusual experience for the lawyer who under-
takes to investigate the law on a given point to discover that
the authorities are in conflict and the principles in doubt. When
such a state of things exists he usually finds in the treatises of
those who have dealt with the problem a recognition of the exist-
ence of the difficulties of the subject and some comment upon the
divergence of judicial opinion. It is not often that he is com-
pelled to witness a conflict of authority as to whether or not
a conflict of authority exists. Yet this legal paradox seems
to be fairly descriptive of the present state of professional
opinion in regard to the criterion of partnership. Some'
learned writers are of opinion that the question at the head
of this article is answered with satisfactory unanimity by the
voice of modern authority and that the entire law of paitner-
ship has assumed a definite form corresponding in some
measure to that which has been attained in those portions of
our legal system where the law is best settled. Others, while
themselves entertaining definite views in regard to the proper
answer to the question, see even in the modern cases a dis-
couraging lack of adherence to any fixed principle of decision
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and find a difference of opinion on points of vital importance
even as between authors who unite in proclaiming that uni-
formity has been attained. Thus, Sir Frederick Pollock and
Sir Nathaniel Lindley consider that the principles of the part-
nership relation have been fully established and are susceptible
of expression in definitions and of application in formulas.'
With this view we contrast the following observation of Mr.
James Parsons in the introduction to his "Exposition of the
Principles of Partnership:" "I am astounded by the state-
ment which both Lindley and Pollock, the leading authors
who have written upon the subject, concur in making, that
the law of partnership is ripe for codification." After pointing
out that these authorities lack guiding principles upon which
to proceed in the work of evolving a system, Parsons pro-
ceeds : " Look at the law of partnership as it stands to-day,
and try to point out the principle which underlies the relation.
The last English case abandons the only landmark which
remained to individualize a partnership.2 There is no clue left
to distinguish a partnership from any other. agency." In
Poolgy v. Driver,3 Sir George Jessel refers to the attempt made
by very many people to define a partnership and mentions
the collection in Lindley on Partnership of fifteen definitions
by different learned lawyers. He says, " I think no two of
them exactly agree but there is considerable agreement
amongst them; and I suppose anybody reading the fifteen
may get a general knowledge of what partnership means."
In the fifth edition of Lindley's work the fifteen definitions
have grown to eighteen. Lindley himself does not undertake
to define the term partnership but says " an agreement that
something shall be attempted with a view to gain and that the
gain shall be shared by the parties to the agreement, is the
grand characteristic of every partnership and is the leading
feature of nearly every definition of the term." There is at
I See Pollock's remarks on codification in the preface to the 3d and 4th
editions of his Digest of the Law of Partnership and Lindley's expression
of approbation in the preface to his 5th edition.
2Badeley v. Consolidated Bank, 38 Ch. D. 238 (1886). Mr. Parsons
wrote in i S89.
S 5 Ch. D. 458 (1876).
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least room for doubt whether a reading of these eighteen
definitions of partnership will enable the mind to form any
such conception of a partnership as will serve as a basis for
the development of a coherent system of partnership law. It
may also be suggested, with respect for so distinguished an
authority, that the student has a right to expect from Lindley
a more definite statement of" the grand characteristic of every
partnership" than the statement that it is "an agreement that
something shall be attempted with a view to gain and that the
gain shall be shared by the parties to the agreement." Per-
haps it is the vagueness of the conception of a partnership as
presented by these authorities that accounts for their view that
the law of partnership is substantially settled. If one has a
hazy conception of what a partnership is, it is difficult to say
whether two decisions are in conflict or in accord. It is gen-
erally true that a conflict of authorities can be detected only
when the issue is distinctly framed. Parsons has a much more
definite conception to put before his readers than that which is
to be gathered from the texts of the other authorities. He insists
that the joint estate resulting from the contributions of the dif-
ferent partners is the basis of partnership. The property alone
is sufficient to make the proprietor a partner although he takes
no part in the management of the business. "It is this feature,"
says Parsons, "which distinguishes the Common law from the
Civil law partnership. It is the property which extends the
private bargain of the Civil law and converts it into the busi-
ness-establishment of a Common law partnership." I He
accordingly proceeds to determine the nature of the partner's
contribution and then the title by which the property of the
firm is held. He points out that it is the property which
"measures the capacity of a partner. The partner pledges
the firm property by each firm transaction and thus creates a
right in the firm creditor." This principle clears up the mys-
tery of marshalling assets. "The dual position of a partner,
(a survival of the societas bonorum universorum,) who is charged
with unlimited liability, in spite of the fact that he contributes
but a portion of his estate, creates a collision of rights at the
'Introduction; P. lxix.
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start. The law adheres to tradition, and enforces the liability.
'Equity recognizes that the liability should be limited to the
contribution, and where its principles apply, controls the firm
-creditors who seek to enforce the liability against the separate
estate in competition with the separate creditors. Both the
legal right and the equitable control of its exercise must be
apprehended, in order to appreciate the exact limits of each.
The want of a clear understanding of the difference between
the position of the firm and of the separate creditors has intro-
duced a combat of opinion which a statement of the right and
of the equity is sufficient to terminate."
The book in which Mr. Parsons has worked out his solution
of the problems of partnership is not as widely known as it
deserves to be. The author's style is such that his thought
is difficult to follow. He takes little pains to disclose his
meaning to any one but the most patient reader. Many of
his statements are curiously elliptical and, in general, it may
be said that the whole subject is treated by him as if it were
in the highest degree abstruse. The form in which the book
is cast is unfamiliar to the English-speaking lawyer. The
subject is reduced to some two hundred and sixteen proposi-
tions or compendious statements of the various doctrines of
partnership law and each of these is followed, as if it were a
proposition in geometry, by'the proof which the author adduces
in its support. The proof is followed by concise statements
of typical judicial decisions, so selected as to illustrate a theory
or to give point to a criticism. The book as a whole is not
one that the " practitioner" is likely to use and its eccentrici-
ties of form and expression have sometimes led younger
students to underestimate its true worth. The present writer,
however, is one of many who are deeply impressed with the
acuteness of the author's criticisms and with the breadth and
solidity of his work of construction. An accomplished
civilian and a student of the modern law in Germany and
France, Mr. Parsons has brought to his work a thorough
knowledge of the whole field of American and English judicial
ISee a striking tribute to the work of Parsons in the preface to Short's
recently )ublished book on Corporate Bonds and Mortgages.
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decision and an intimate acquaintance with the treatises of the
jurists who have discussed problems of partnership law.
Under these circumstances it is to be expected that lie should
emphasize the importance of an orderly development of the
law of partnership on the basis of some single guiding and
controlling principle. This he finds, as has been intimated
already, in the notion of firm property and he declares that
when this notion is brought forward "the material is furnished
for an explanation of the relation in all its bearings." The
circumstance that a second edition of his work is about to
make its appearance and that advance sheets of it have come
into the hands of the writer, seems to make this an opportune
time at which to begin a series of papers in this magazine
devoted to discussions of various problems of partnership law.
It is part of the plan to present in the light of Mr. Parsons'
theories a somewhat fuller discussion of certain well known
partnership decisions than is to be found in the pages of his
work. If, in the course of the discussions, anything of value
is developed, the credit belongs to Mr. Parsons and not to the
writer. Mr. Parsons is not, however, responsible for all the
views expressed nor for the application of his theories to
particular cases. In the present paper the question for con-
sideration is "What Constitutes a Partnership?"
By the Roman law partnership was originally a family
arrangement. Later the relation was enlarged and the
voluntary element was introduced which in time became a
distinctive character of partnership. The relation was founded
on mutual confidence and the partners became, as it were.
mutual trustees in the business. The law, accordingly, was
chiefly occupied with the definition of the relation of the
partners among themselves: it was almost silent in regard to
the rights of third persons against the firm. " Co-owners or
co-tenants of land might be partners in it, not because they
converted the land into merchandise for traffic, but simply
because they effected a joint purchase, and without reference
to any use or disposition they might make of the land." "The
trade partnership arose from farming the public revenues which
overtaxed the administrative resources of the Republic, and
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was committed to private individuals." Partnerships were
either for gain or not for gain.'
In medieval times we find that the commercial law of
Western Europe had so developed that the test of one's
liability as a partner was his joining as a proprietor in manage-
ment of the business. In order to De a partner one must
needs be a manager as well as an owner. By contributing
property to a business exclusively conducted by others one
does not become liable beyond the amount of his contribution.
The Roman conception of strict confidence was maintained,
as was natural in a predatory period. "The intimacy and trust
of kinship " made the family a useful agency in carrying on
business and family partnerships were therefore common.
When we turn to England, we find a development different
from that which took place at Rome or under the Law
Merchant.
"Under the Feudal law all the rights and duties of the
individual took root in the possesion of property. Land, the
most usual and important form of property, became in effect,
though not in name, a legal person, and the man a mere
incident or locmn tenens. Personal property never had this
independent legal status, but the habit of mind acquired in
dealing with real estate led the Common lawyers to personify
the contribution of a partner." 2 One who made a contribution
to the enterprise, whether his contribution consisted of skill or
of service or of money, was regarded, in virtue of his contribu-
tion, as a proprietor or owner of the enterprise even if he took
no part in its management or its direction. In contrast with
the Civil law as developed in medioval and modern times,
which regards participation in management as a condition of
general partnership liability, the Common law regards the
contributor as so identified with his contribution that he is
treated as being in the firm in virtue of the presence of his
property in the common stock. His unlimited liability to
firm creditors followed as a matter of course, "The dormant,
I See, in general, James Parsons Part. .i. Throughout these papers
foot-notes which merely designate pages and sections are to be understood
as referring to Mr. Parsons' work.
P 3.
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partner is the typical common law partner." It may be said,
therefore, that proprietorship in the business is the test of
partnership at Common law.' If the question is whether A
is a partner with B and C, we must scrutinize the facts of the
relation between the three for the purpose of determining
whether the business belongs to A as it does to B and C, or
,whether A has merely a personal claim against B and C
which he expects that B and C will be enabled to satisfy by
the successful conduct of their business. What are the indicia
of ownership? He who owns property takes the increment
of value thereof and he is said to make a profit out of his
holding. If, therefore, he has embarked in business and the
business is successful, he takes the profits of the business
because the profit belongs to the proprietor. The proprietor
of a business, in virtue of his ownership, cont- ols the manage-
ment of the business, whether the actual conduct of it is in his
hands or in the hands of his agents. He does not part
absolutely with his title or trust to anybody else for its
recovery. His position is to be contrasted with that of a
lender who surrenders his property to the debtor and in the
simplest typical case trusts only to the debtor's solvency as
security for the loan. If a man is entitled to the profits of a
business he is, prima fade, a partner-not because he takes
profits but because the taking of profits tends to identify himn as a
proprietor. A lender, however, may stipulate for a share of
profits and a lender is the very opposite of a proprietor. The
mere participation in profits is, therefore, not conclusive. If
he who shares the profits has no right to insist that the money
lent by him shall be used in the business and has no powers
of control, he cannot be regarded as a proprietor and he is
therefore not a partner. If, however, he takes a profit and
stipulates that the sum lent shall be retained in the business
and can enjoin the borrowers from withdrawing it, he is a
partner.2
It will be perceived that it is quite immaterial whether or
not the parties in a given case intend to subject themsZ-1hres to
4 54.2 64.
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the liabilities of partners.' If they intend that they shall be
invested with the prerogatives of ownership, then the law
fixes upon them the responsibilities as well as the privileges
incident to the partnership relation.2 Partnership is, therefore,
not a contract: it is a status which results from a contract.'
The term " Partnership" means a relation between two or
more persons. The existence or non-existence of the relation-
ship follows as the result of their conduct towards one another.
If their conduct takes the form of an agreement by which each
is invested with the indicia of co-proprietorship, they become
partners even if they expressly stipulate that they shall not be
partners. It follows that a man is either a partner or he is
not. There can be no such thing as a partnership as to third
persons in the absence of a partnership between the parties."
Of course, a man may, in virtue of the doctrine of estoppel,
preclude himself from denying that he is subject to a partner-
ship liability; but this results from a principle of equity and
has nothing to do with partnership law. One who has so
estopped himself is not a partner at all. He may, for conveni-
ence, be called a quasi or nominal partner, as Ames uses the
term There is, however, no room for the distinction attempted
by Lindley I between "true partnerships " and "quasi partner-
ships." A defendant is liable as a partner either because he
is in fact a proprietor of the firm stock or because he is
estopped from denying that he is a partner. There is no
other basis of liability.
As the partnership liability of a defendant results from his
assumption of the position of proprietor and exists independ-
ently of the will of the defendant, it often happens that the
liability exists where it was never suspected and it is ome-
times imposed under circumstances of great hardship. It
follows naturally that. in a doubtful case, a court will not
1 45-
2 See the remarks of Sir George Jessel on this point in Pooley v. Driver,
5 Ch. D. 458 (1876).
3 xoi.
4 See the trenchant and characteristic observations of Lord Bramwell to
this effect in Bullen v,. Sharp, L. R. i C. P. 86 (1865).
5 Ames's Cases on Partnership, 138.
, I*0, *25.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A PARTNERSHIP?
hold a defendant to partnership liability. It must appear
clearly that he has secured for himself all the rights of a co-
proprietor in the business before the court is justified in
subjecting him to corresponding liabilities. There can be no
clear inference of such co-proprietorship if the facts are
consistent with the existence of some other and older form of
legal relation. In a given case the phenomena may be
satisfied by the hypothesis of co-ownership, of sale on joint
account, .of bailment, of factorship, of the relation of master
and servant or of lessor and lessee. In such a case the parties
will be held not to be partners.'
The principles which the writer has been endeavoring to set
forth may be seen to advantage in their application to concrete
cases. It therefore becomes expedient to apply the theory of
proprietorship to a number of typical partnership decisions.
In Grace v. Smith,2 it appeared that B and C had been
partners but that the partnership had been dissolved. C by
the agreement of dissolution purchased the stock in trade and
debts due the partnership, while B was to receive back again
the money which he had put into the partnership and a sum
representing past profits. He was also to make a loan of a
smaller sum to C, at five per cent. interest, C paying him an
annuity of three thousand pounds per annum. C carried on
the business in his own name and A, who subsequently sold
goods to C, brought an action of assumpsit against B to
charge him as a secret partner. Clearly A had no right to
recover against B. After the agreement of dissolution was
consummated B was in the position of a vendor who has
sold his property partly for cash and partly on credit. His
position was the opposite of that of an owner or proprietor.
It does not appear that he had any right to control the busi-
ness or even to insist that it should be carried on. It was
found as a fact that the sum paid by way of annuity was a
personal claim against C and was not "payable out of the
profits." Even if it had been payable out of the profits, B's
position would still have been clearly that of a vendor and his
1 67.
2f2 Wmn. BI. 998 (1775).
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right to share in the profits of the business would have sprung
not from proprietorship but from the assignment to him by C
who was the owner of them. The court, however, based a
denial of A's right of recovery on less satisfactory grounds.
" Every man who has a share of the profits of a trade," said
Chief Justice De Grey, " ought also to bear his share of the
loss." 1 "If any one," he proceeded, "takes part of the profit,
he takes a part of that fund upon which the creditor of the
trader relies for his payment." " I think the true criterion is,
to inquire whether Smith (B) agreed to share the profit of the
trade with Robinson (C), or whether he only relied on those
profits as a fund of payment." It may be observed, however,
that the word "profits" has no meaning except when used
with reference to an owner and his property. From the
creditor's point of view there is no distinction between profits
and capital. Whatever is the debtor's property the creditor
is entitled to take.' It may also be observed that even between
the owner and his property there cannot be a profit until the
creditors are paid. " The creditors cannot realize on that
which does not come into existence until they have ceased to
exist, i. e., are satisfied." 3
Grace v. Smith is one of many cases which complicate the
question as to the existence of a partnership by discussing
whether the share of profits of the business stipulated for by
the defendant is or is not a usurious return for the use of his
money If the radical difference between a proprietor and a
lender is borne in mind, it will be perceived that these ques-
tions are wholly distinct from one another. If the defendant
I This is true if he who takes a share is a proprietor. If so. he is liable
because he is a proprietor. If he is not a proprietor, he is not liable as a
partner, even if he takes by assignment a share of the proprietor's profit.
2This is evidently the thought in Lord Bramwell's mind in Bullen v.
Sharp, Supra, where (in quoting C. J. De Grey) he remarks: "This
would be a bad reason if true in fact. A man who trusts another generally
has a claim on his profits and capital too. How does a man who trusts
the former only more affect the creditor's fund ?"
3 55.
4See, for example, Morriset v. King, 2 Bur. 891 (1759) ; Bloxam v. Pell,
2 Win. BI. 999 (1775). The true principle is recognized in Morse v.
Wilson, 4 T. R. 353 (1791).
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js a partner no question of usury can possibly arise, If he is
not a partner it is quite immaterial, from the plaintiff's point of
view, whether the defendant's contract is or is not tainted
with usury,
In Hoare v. Dawes,l a broker had been employed by a
number of persons, of whom B and C were two, to purchase
a lot of tea of which each was to have a separate share.
There was not any joint concern in the re-disposal of the tea.
The vendor of the tea (the East India Company) issued war-
rants for the tea to the broker who, as was the custom in the
businpss, pledged them to A. The broker became bankrupt
and the value of tea sank. Although B and C had paid
their proportion of the purchase money, A sued them for the
full amount of purchase money, claiming that they were
partners. A was held not to be entitled to recover. The
court were of the opinion that thiS was not a case of partner-
ship though no very definite reason was given for the decision.
The decision was clearly right. The purchase by the broker,
though joint in form, was several in substance. Even had it
been otherwise, the right of the plaintiff to recover against B
and C would have depended upon the joint contract and not
upon the existence of a partnership. B and C were not
proprietors in trade or business, for ip this case there was no
act either of trade o; business. "Trade" involves buying and
selling. When partnership was confined to trade there could
b e no such thing as a partnership in buying only or a partner-
ship in selling only. Even in modern times, partnership being
now co-extensive with the scope of "business," it must at least
appear that the parties alleged to be partners are embarked in
business together and here it4ppeared that they were not.
The facts in Waugl v. Carver' are too well known to require
extended statement. The action was assumpsit against B, a
merchant of Goslort, for goods sold and delivered to C, a
merchant of Cowes. B and C had entered into a contract in
virtue of which each was to use his influence for the purpose
of directing custom to the business house of the other and each
'I Douglas, 371 (178o).
•2 Henry Blackstone, 235.
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was to receive a proportion of the profits of the business done
by the other. The agreement contained covenants to the
effect that neither would make inconsistent arrangements with
third persons during the life of the contract. Provision was
also made for the settlement of accounts and for arbitration in
cases of a dispute. B was held liable on the ground that he
had entitled himself to take a portion of the profits of C's
house " generally and indefinitely as they should arise "and was
therefore, upon the authority of Grace v. Smith, taking "from
the creditors a part of that fund which is security to them for
the payment of their debts." The fallacy involved in the
reason assigned for the decision has already been commented
upon. The decision itself was wrong. There was no common
business belonging to B and C. B was entitled to exercise
only a slight degree of control over C in the management of
C's business; C had no powers of control over B. The
agreement showed that each was to conduct his own business
and receive the profits thereof, and was to assign a certain
proportion to the other in consideration of that other's service
as an agent.
In Frenclz v. Stjring,' A and D had jointly purchased a
race horse. D sold his share of the horse to C and it was
agreed between C and A that A should train the horse, have
the control and management of him and pay the expense of
entering him in different races. The expenses of the horse's
keep were to be equally divided between A and C, and the
winnings were to be shared in a like proportion. B, with the
consent of A, took C's place, and A subsequently sued B
for a moiety of the keep and expenses. B defended on the
ground that he and A were partners and that an action at law
was not maintainable. It was held that A was entitled to
recover: "It is no more a partnership," said Willes, J., "than
if two tenants in common of a house agreed that one of them
should have the general management and provide funds for
necessary repairs so as to render the house fit for the occupa-
tion of a tenant and that the net rent should be divided among
them equally." This was clearly a case in which the theory
12 C. B. N. S. 255 (1857).
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of a mere holding in common furnished an adequate explana-
tion of the relation between the parties. The question at issue
involved an advance made by one co-owner for the benefit of
the common property. If the parties could be regarded as
having embarked in business then the explanation of a tenancy
in common would not suffice, and upon the principle of pro-
prietorship they would be held to be partners in the enterprise.
The thought here suggested is well illustrated by a reference
to the case of ships. At first the ship was treated as not
forming part of the firm stock where the co-owners fitted her
out, freighted her and sent her off on a voyage.1 Gradually,
however, the ship itself became, as it were, identified with the
enterprise and the co-owners came to be regarded as partners
in virtue of the doing of a continuous business comprising a
series of voyages.'
Another well known case is Cox v. Hickmnan.3 Of this case
Sir Montague Smith said in Mollwo, Marchi & Company v.
The Court of Wards;4-- The judgment in Cox v. Hickman
had certainly the effect of dissolving the rule of law which
had been supposed to exist, and laid down principles of decis-
ion by which the determination of cases of this kind is made
to depend, not on arbitrary presumptions of law, but on the
real contracts and relations of the parties." He used this
language because the theory that he who takes part of the
profits is necessarily a partner was in that case finally discarded
as a principle of decision. "The law," said Lord Bramwell
M umford v. Nicholl, 20 Johnson, 61r (1822).
2 Williams v. Lawrence, 47 N. Y. 462 (1872). See also Eldridge v.
Froost, 6 Rob. (N. Y.) 5x8 (1866). For a case in which the real relation
of the parties was that of lessor and lessee and where the inference should
have been against the existence of a partnership even under the view of
ihe testimony most favorable to the plaintiff, see Dry v. Boswell, i Camp.
329 (i8og). For a case in which the relation between the parties was
that of principal and agent and where the inerence was against partner-
ship although the agent shared'profits and loss, see Meyers v. Sharpe, 5
Taunt. 74 (1813). See also 27 where Parsons disposes of the contention
sometimes made that persons may be "partners in the profits but not in
the stock of the firm." On theory of proprietorship such a relation is
impossible.
38 House of Lord's Cases, 268 (i86o).
44 Privy Council App. 419 (1872).
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in Bullen v. Sharp,1 "had drifted into the condition from
which it was rescued by Cox v. Hickman." The facts were,
brieflly as follows: X and Y had become insolvent. Their
creditors, instead of selling them out, executed a deed of
arrangement, to which X and Y were parties, by which
certain of the creditors were appointed trustees to take posses-
sion of the business established by X and Y, to carry on the
business under the name of the "Stanton Iron Company"
and to divide net income (which was always to be deemed the
property of X and Y) among the creditors of X and Y. A
majority of the creditors had power to control the conduct of
the business but when the debts had been paid the trustees
were to hold the property in trust for X and Y. A supplied
goods to the trustees and drew certain bills of exchange which
were accepted by one of the trustees in the name of the Stanton
Iron Company. A sued IB and C, two of the creditors2 upon
the theory that they had become partners in virtue of the
execution of the deed. It was held that B and C were not
liable. Lord Cranworth's opinion is a vindication of the prin-
ciple of proprietorship. Referring to the status of the partner,
he says, "The real ground of the liability is that the trade has
been carried on by persons acting on his behalf." " It is not
strictly correct to say that his right to share in the profits
makes him liable to the debts of the trade. The correct mode
of stating the proposition is that the same thing which entitles
him to the one makes him liable to the other, namely, the fact
that the trade has been carried on on 'his behalf; i. e., that he
stood in the relation of principal towards the persons acting
ostensibly as traders, by whom the liabilities have been in-
curred, and under whose management the profits have been
made. Taking this to be the ground of liability as a partner it
seems to me to follow that the mere concurrence of creditors in
an arrangement under which they permit theirdebtor, or trustees
for their debtor, to continue his trade, applying the profits in
discharge of their demands, does not make them partners
' Supra.
2 Both B and C had been named as trustees, but B had resigned the
trust and C had never acted in that character.
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with.their debtor, or the trustees. The debtor is still the
person solely interested in the profits, save only that he has
mortgaged them to his creditors. He receives the benefit of
the profits as they accrue, though he has precluded himself
from applying them to any other purpose than the discharge
of his debts. The trade is not carried on by or on account of
the creditors; though'their consent is necessary in such a case,
for without it all the property might be seized by them in
execution. But the trade still remains the trade of the debtor
or his trustees; the debtor or the trustees are the persons by
or on behalf of whom it is carried on." Lord Cranworth
then proceeds to say that the powers of control given to the
creditors by the deed were consistent with the maintenance of
the relation of debtor and creditor, and do not afford a basis
for the contention that the creditors had become proprietors
or owners in the business. Lord Cranworth uses the expres-
sion "principals" throughout his judgment, but it is obvious
that he uses that word to designate those to whom the busi-
ness belongs. The same fundamental thought evidently un-
derlies the opinion of Lord Wensleydale, although he is led
by the use of the word "principal" to dwell upon the ele-
ment of agency in a way that is not incorrect, but is, perhaps,
misleading.
Following Cox v. Hickman come the cases of Klshaw v.
Jukes' and Billen v. Sharp.' In the former case it appeared
that the creditor had agreed to assist his debtors in a building
operation, in consideration of a participation in their profit,
until his debt should be extinguished. In the latter case a
father had guarinteed the son's business to a certain extent in
.consideration of the payment of an annuity, which was to be
increased in proportion to profits if they reached beyond a
certain amount. In each case it was held that the debtor was
still the person solely interested in the profits, save that he
had transferred a part of them to the defendant as a creditor.
In neither case, therefore, was the defendant held to be a
partner.
13 B. &. G. 847 (1863).
2 L. R. i C. P. 86 (1865).
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In Mollwo, March & Company v. The cow-i of Wards,' the
creditor of a firm took a mortgage of all its property, landed
or otherwise, including its stock in trade. He was also given
extensive powers of control, in the sense that he could re-
strain the trading of the debtors if he considered it excessive.
It was further agreed that he should receive a commission of
20 per cent. on all net profits and 12 per cent. on cash ad-
vances made or to be made. It will be observed, however,
that even upon such a state of facts there could be no clear
inference of proprietorship. The story began with the un-
doubted relation of lender and borrower. All that followed
was consistent with the taking of security by a creditor. The
creditor made no stipulation which could be explained only
upon the theory that he became a part owner of the business.
After the repayment of his advances and the stipulated return,
his interest necessarily terminated. Large as were his powers
of control, they were wholly of a n _ tive character. He
" had no initiative powers; he could not direct what ship-
ments should be made or consignments ordered, or what
should be the course of trade. He could not require the
Watsons to continue to trade, or even to remain in partner-
ship." Contrast with this case the facts in Badeley v. Con-
solidated Bank.- There the so-called loan was made concur-
rently with the stipulation for a share of profits and for powers
of control. There was no antecedent relation of debtor and
creditor. Moreover, the lender's powers of control were char-
acteristic of ownership. The agreement for a share of profits
included a stipulation for profits after the loan should be re-
funded and in order to obtain the continued profits the
so-called lender could still control the business after he had
been paid off both principal and interest. The court, never-
theless, held that the relation between the parties continued to
be that of debtor and creditor, and was not replaced by a co-
proprietorship. It is submitted that the decision was certainly
wrong. A just view of the case, in which a proprietor at-
tempts to relieve himself from responsibility of ownership by
I Sulira.
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masquerading in the guise of a lender, is the view taken by
Sir George Jessel, in Poolej, v. Drivcr.' That distinguished
judge, by a searching analysis of the facts, showed that th
would-be creditor had stipulated for all the rights of an
owner, and he reached the inevitable conclusion that that
which was called a loan was, in substance, a property contri-
bution to the common stock.
The last case which space permits us to examine is .lerral
v. Dobbins.2  Here it appeared that B and C had entered
into an, agreement purporting to be a lease by B to C of a
certain hotel. There was a provision that B should not be
liable for the business done or for the debts contracted by C.
Applying the test of proprietorship, the court found no diffi-
culty in holding that A, who had sold goods to C for the
purpose of the business, was entitled to hold B liable as a
.partner. B, by the terms of the instrument, was entitled to
insist that the business should be carried on by C, that B or
his representatives should have free access to the premises,
that, in addition to the rent reserved, he should be paid eighty
per cent. of the net profits, and that he should have the ap-
pointment of a person to keep the books, act as cashier and
handle the receipts. There was also a provision for the right
in B to terminate the agreement upon twenty-four hours'
notice, but C was to control and manage the business during
the continuance of the contract. The court considered the
agreement as evidence of the intention of the parties "to become
joint owners of the business." The relation of lessor and
lessee was not adequate to explain the phenomena of the
case. It is submitted that the decision was correct. :'
'5 Ch. D. 458 (1876).
2 169 Pa. 480 (1895).
',In the course of his opinion Mr. Justice Fell used the following lan-
guage: "We are not concerned with the question whether the law of the
state by which the contract is governed is in harmony with the olil
English rule of Grace v. Smith, 2 Win. Blackstone, 998, and Waugh ',.
Carver, 2 H. Blackstone, 235, which makes participation in the profits
conclusive of the liability of the participant to creditors without regard
to the agreement or intention of the parties, or with the modern rule 4f
Cox v. Hickman, 2 H. L. C. 268, under which a participation in profits
is held to be strong but not conclusive evidence of a partnership, and the
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The foregoing cases have been selected because they present
a great variety of facts. They have been chosen from the
great mass of judicial decisions in which the courts have
attempted the solution of this fundamental problem of part-
nership law. It is of course not contended that the theory of
co-proprietorship reconciles the decisions. On the contrary,
it brings into strong relief the conflict of authority which is
conceived to exist. It is contended, however, that this is the
theory which affords the only rational basis for the develop-
ment of a coherent system of partnership law. As for the
conflict of authority, the remark made at the beginning of this
paper may be emphasized at its close ;-that the conflict can
be avoided only by proclaiming such an absence of fixed
principle as would be most discreditable to our legal system.
George Wharton Pepper.
whole transaction is taken into consideration in order to determine
whether the relation of partners was to be created. If there was a part-
lhership resulting from intention, all other questions drop out of the
case." With deference it may be suggested that the learned judge was
necessarily concerned with the question which he sought to put aside.
The decision which he made and the satisfactory reasons assigned for the
decision necessarily involved a rejection of the rule in Grace v. Smith
and Waugh v. Carver, and an adoption of the principle vindicated in
Cox v. Hickman. The expression "a partnership resulting from inten-
tion " is somewhat misleading. B and C were co-proprietors by
intention and therefore were in law partners. It is clear that they did
not intend to assume the liabilities of partners.
